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Abstract: Flexicurity is viewed as the best way of  securing both a 
good investment environment and a secure workforce. Flexicurity 
combines a flexible labor market, where employers have few 
or no restrictions with regard to firing workers, with generous 
welfare benefits; and the two are facilitated through active labor 
market policies. Denmark really has a flexible labor market; 
but benefits in case of  unemployment and activation cannot 
be described as generous in a European context. Activation 
is often perceived as a punishment for being unemployed and 
has mainly been undertaken because it is mandatory, and one 
is in risk of  losing benefits if  one refuses an activation offer. 
There is a price to be paid for a high degree of  flexibility, and it 
comes in the form of  marginalization and exclusion. 25 percent 
of  the Danish population of  working ages is for long spells or 
permanently existing on not very generous benefits outside the 
labor market.
Key words: Flexible labor market; Danish labor market policy; 
Active labor market policies, Marginalization.
Introduction: Recent changes in Unemployment 
Legislation in Denmark
With the labor market reform of  1994 the principle of  
active labor market policy was fully implemented within the social 
insurance system of  welfare governance. A couple of  experimental 
leave schemes were made more permanent. The education leave was a 
scheme enabling insured workers 25 years of  age and older to take 
1   Revised version of  a paper prepared for presentation to the Annual Meeting of  the Taiwan 
Welfare Association, Shu-Chow University, Taipei, May 23rd 2009.
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time out, at least one week, at the most one year, to participate in 
some kind of  recognized education receiving benefits equivalent 
to unemployment benefits. The child care leave was a scheme 
allowing parents with children up to eight years of  age to take 
time out to care for their children up to one year and at least for 
13 weeks. The scheme was open to everyone affiliated with the 
labor market, whether insured or on social assistance.  Because 
of  its popularity the benefits was reduced from 100 percent of  
unemployment benefits to first 70 and then to 60 percent. While 
on child care leave children cannot occupy a space in a public 
child care institution. Finally, the sabbatical leave was a time limited 
experiment running till 1999, allowing employed insured people 
25 and older to take up to one year and at least 13 weeks, out 
from the labor market provided they could find a substitute, to 
fill their spot, during the period of  time. Benefits were reduced 
to 60 percent of  unemployment benefits. (Andersen, Appeldorn, 
Weise 1996.) The leave schemes, especially the education leave 
was at the core of  the reform, of  what Per Kongshøj Madsen 
has labeled the comprehensive approach where the activation of  
the unemployed should be combined with the efforts to upgrade 
the skills of  the workforce in general (1999: 66). The reform was 
summed up thus:
Danish labor market policy has undergone rather drastic 
changes in recent years. The share of  active expenditures has 
increased… The formation and implementation of  policy has 
been decentralized (the steering reform). At the same time the use 
of  instruments and programs have been changed (the activation 
reform). For insured unemployed the maximum duration of  
benefits and participation in activation programs has been 
reduced from approximate nine years to five years [now four 
years] (Madsen 1999: 65).
The schemes were meant to increase the circulation in the 
labor market between unemployment and employment; but as 
the schemes became increasingly popular the government feared 
that they might create bottle-necks by reducing unemployment 
too much and they were therefore made less attractive. The child 
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care leave must be viewed as a universal right, while the other two 
leave schemes were reserved for workers belonging to the social 
insurance system, and thus was a performative trend in welfare 
governance in Denmark. Furthermore the reform entailed a 
strong element of  decentralization to the regional and local levels 
of  governance.
With the new Social Assistance Act of  1997 the active labor 
market/workfare strategy has been strengthened indicating a 
stronger emphasis on the obligation of  the claimants to participate 
in some activity arranged or referred to by the municipality. It 
can be stated that the fact that social assistance now is codified in 
three different acts where one is directly called ‘The activation act’ 
follows from the development of  the previous years. The new act 
was implemented July 1998, but already since 1994 all claimants 
under the old legislation had to accept an activation offer presented 
to them by the municipality, and since 1990 the young have had to 
accept activation in exchange for cash benefits. So, what to begin 
with only concerned the young, now applies to everybody.
The Danish unemployment benefit system is, in principle, 
a social insurance scheme, hence, entitlements to both transfers 
and services are tied to labor market performance; entitlements 
are also dependent upon obligations to participate in various job 
training and educational activities. This is due to the ‘active’ turn 
within Danish welfare policy. Expenditure equals 10 percent of  
total social expenditure or three percent of  GDP.
All recipients of  unemployment benefits are furthermore 
entitled and obliged to accept a new offer of  activation when 
they have received public benefits for a total of  six months after 
termination of  the first offer of  activation. Activation early in 
the benefit period is based on need and is flexible, partly aimed 
at groups at risk of  becoming long-term unemployed and partly 
to prevent lack of  qualified manpower (‘bottle necks’). After a 
maximum of  13 weeks, unemployed recipients of  cash assistance 
under the age of  30 are entitled to and obliged to accept an offer of  
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activation or training for at least 30 hours per week for 18 months; 
however only for six months for people with an education/
training qualifying them to work. Recipients of  cash assistance 
of  30 years or more must be offered activation no later than 12 
months after having been granted cash assistance. All recipients 
of  cash assistance, apart from those over 30 years, who receive 
benefits, not only due to unemployment, are furthermore entitled 
to and obliged to accept a new offer of  activation when they have 
received cash assistance for six months after termination of  the 
first activation offer. Unemployed people are entitled to wages 
during job training, while the benefits payable in connection with 
other activation and training measures largely correspond to the 
amount of  daily cash benefits or cash assistance. (NOSOSCO 
2006: 87-90.)
At any given time two to four percent of  the Danish labor 
force was in activation from 1995 to 2004 (NOSOSCO 2008: 
71).
Eligibility for social assistance, whether services or transfers, 
are – per definition – subject to means, needs and work test; it is 
a discretionary, i.e. a clientistic system. Recipients are obliged to 
undertake activities such as education, training, workfare or the 
like. Social assistance is taxable, and cash assistance to people, who 
are obliged to provide for children, equals about 80 per cent of  the 
maximum rate of  the unemployment benefit. For non-providers, 
the assistance equals about 60 per cent of  the unemployment 
benefit. Young people under the age of  25, who do not have 
any children living with them, are entitled to special, lower youth 
benefits. Recipients of  cash benefits, who pay high net rents or 
have large obligations as providers, may furthermore be granted a 
special benefit which is tax-free. Income such as income from work 
will be deducted from the cash assistance, whereas child benefits 
and rent subsidies do not cause the assistance to be reduced. 
The rent subsidy will, however, be taken into account when the 
special assistance is calculated. With a view to ensure that it pays 
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better to work, a ceiling was introduced in 2003 in relation to the 
entire assistance by way of  cash benefits, special benefits and rent 
subsidies after six months’ receipt of  cash benefits. Besides, cash 
benefits to married couples will be reduced after six months at the 
same time as the employment deduction will be increased. Besides, 
the cash benefits to young people under 25 will be reduced after 
six months to a level corresponding to the State education grants 
and loans.
As from July 1 2002, a condition for being awarded the 
full cash assistance amount is that one has been a resident in the 
country for at least seven out of  the past eight years. People, who 
do not comply with this requirement, are entitled to the so-called 
start assistance, which is lower than the cash assistance. Local 
authorities may furthermore grant assistance based on need to 
non-recurrent expenses, removals, medical treatment, medicine, 
dental treatment and the like, to cash assistance recipients and to 
others, who are unable to pay the costs. In case a recipient of  cash 
assistance rejects an offer of  work or activation without reasonable 
course and is not available for work, the local authorities may 
discontinue payment of  the assistance. In case a recipient of  cash 
assistance rejects an offer of  activation or fails to appear without 
reasonable course when he has been offered activation, the local 
authorities may reduce the assistance by up to one third.
The expenditure for social assistance and housing, the two 
elements of  Danish welfare policy directly addressed to the poor 
only take up six percent of  total social expenditure or two percent 
of  GDP.
Table 1. Adults receiving social assistance during the year in percent 
of  the total adult population 1981 – 2004
1981 1984 1987 1990 1994 1997 2000 2004 2007
6.5 6.8 5.9 5.8 5.4 4.5 4.1 4.4 3.3
Source: NOSOSCO (1995, 1999, 2006, 2008).
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The number of  social assistance recipients calculated as 
whole year recipients match closely the income poor – those 
receiving less than half  the median equivalized net income, which 
is partly explained by the very low compensation as shown in table 
3 below. It can be said, that poverty is being produced through 
welfare policies.
Change of  Government and Change of  Policy?
November 2001 Denmark got a new government indicating 
a change from a Centre-Left to a Right wing government. The 
former was headed by the Social Democratic party with the then 
prime minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, while the newer and 
present (2009) government is headed by Anders Fog Rasmussen. 
This is a minority government consisting of  the Liberal and the 
Conservative parties and it obtains its parliamentary majority 
through the support of  the so-called Danish Peoples Party, 
a xenophobic, anti immigrant, right wing political party. This 
government has announced that it is committed to enhancing 
employment, which has had a least a semantic consequence with 
the renaming of  the ministry of  labor to ministry of  employment. 
Madsen judges that the change is only semantic (2003: 9). In what 
follows this is verified. 
Labor Market Reform Once Again: ‘More People in Work’
A priority of  the present government as well as one pursued 
by the former one is the creation of  a ‘spatial’ labor market, which 
means a labor market spacious enough to include people that are 
not considered one hundred percent effective and productive. 
One means to achieve such a spacious labor market has been 
the creation of  so-called flexi-jobs. They are jobs under regular 
conditions of  pay but adjusted to the ability of  the individual 
who has a chronic reduction of  work capacity. If  one becomes 
unemployed after having been employed in a flexi-job one is not 
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entitled to unemployment benefits; instead one is eligible for a 
so-called redundancy benefit (ledighedsydelse). It is set at 91 percent 
of  unemployment benefits. The number of  people receiving 
redundancy pay can be seen as an indicator of  the degree of  
spaciousness of  the labor market: are there few people on 
redundancy pay the labor market must be considered spacious 
since it has room for those wanting to work. Unfortunately, the 
number of  people on redundancy pay has increased dramatically: 
from March 2002 to March 2003 it more than quadrupled. During 
the same period of  time the registered unemployment increased 
by nine percent, while unemployment for those waiting for a 
flexi-job increased 408 percent. (Social Årsrapport 2003: 65-68.) 
Judged by these measures the government has failed to create a 
spacious labor market.
This is very disappointing since the government announced 
to enhance employment in general through its reform entitled 
‘More people in work’! Here it was forecasted that employment 
should have increased by 84.000 people by 2010, which, of  course, 
remains to be seen and a number of  changes were introduced: a 
liberalization of  labor exchanges in the form of  contracting out 
of  a number of  the services provided; a reduction in the number 
of  ‘tools’ i.e. activation measures including a reduction in the 
possibility of  receiving an education offer, which, as mentioned 
above, has a reasonable success rate! The general idea is that it 
must pay to work and that everybody should be eligible for work. 
This is being accomplished through tougher rules for taking any 
job, e.g. the demand for geographical mobility has been increased: 
up to four hours daily must be accepted. Social assistance has 
been reduced for couples after six months of  unemployment, 
and for people less than 25 years of  age it is also reduced after six 
months. New candidates cannot any longer qualify for maximum 
unemployment benefits. Sticks and carrots have been distributed 
very unevenly: all the carrots have gone to the employers who 
are now able to employ unemployed people with a wage subsidy, 
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while the sticks are banging the unemployed. (Social Årsrapport 
2003: 51-56).
So the general assumption by the government has been 
that incentives could change the behavior and employability of  
the various marginalized segments of  the Danish population. 
However, evaluations have, time and again, demonstrated that the 
incentives have turned out to be punishments instead as is being 
discussed in some detail in another section below.
Changes in Social Assistance: Start Allowance, the ‘Ceiling’ and 
Partner Allowance
In line with the previous government the present one has 
found it imperative to reduce transfer payments to refugees and 
immigrants as a way of  motivating them to seek employment and 
self  support. Ethnic minorities have a high level of  unemployment 
in Denmark; roughly the double of  the average for the whole 
population, and already in 1999 the former then Social Democratic 
led government enacted the so-called introductory provision. It 
was meant for people who had recently arrived in the country, 
and payments were about two thirds of  regular social assistance. 
However, the government was compelled to withdraw the act after 
complaints had been filed against Denmark for discrimination and 
non compliance with international conventions. Nevertheless, the 
current government has succeeded in creating a legislation which is 
not formally discriminatory. It is called start allowance, and it can 
be given to people who are otherwise eligible for social assistance 
but who have not been residing in Denmark for seven of  the last 
eight years. So, now one has had to have been living in Denmark 
for at least seven years in order to claim social assistance; if  not one 
can claim start allowance. Start allowance provides claimants with 
somewhere between 45 and 64 percent of  social assistance and 
is equivalent to state student grant (Statens Uddannelsesstøtte). Most 
recipients are refugees and the ethnic composition of  recipients 
is highly biased towards people from ‘less developed countries.’ 
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A number of  poverty thresholds were calculated for 2003: 50 
percent and 60 percent net disposable income, a standard budget, 
a discount budget and a basic living level. In all cases were start 
allowance less than any threshold, and that was the case for all 
family types (Social Årsrapport 2003: 112-114). This social policy 
invention is deliberately producing income poverty to a degree 
not seen before in Denmark.
Another initiative introduced by the present government 
was the so-called ‘ceiling’ over social assistance, meaning that no 
recipients could get more than a particularly defined maximum. 
Those individuals and households who had received social 
assistance for more than six months and exceeded the ceiling 
had their benefits cut! The expectation was that the recipients 
would increase their efforts to be employed or otherwise leave the 
social assistance rolls. The National Institute of  Social Research 
evaluated the effects of  this change of  policy, and concluded that 
no such effect could be traced. The investigation was conducted 
as telephone interviews with a little more than 1.000 social 
assistance recipients. They were interviewed twice: the first time 
just before the change was implemented at the turn of  the year 
2003/2004, and the second time in the fall of  2004. While no 
effect of  increased self  sufficiency could be demonstrated the 
effect of  fewer resources was very strongly demonstrated, leading 
to phenomena such as rent arrears, not paying child care fees, not 
paying bank loans etc. The relevant families have also to a smaller 
extent been able to go away on holidays, buy shoes, and go to the 
dentist (Graversen & Tinggaard 2005). So, the effects were there, 
or though not the officially intended ones.
A third initiative taken by the present government was the 
so-called partner assistance which indicated that unless both had 
worked for more than 300 hours within the last two years they 
could no longer both receive assistance. Flemming Larsen and 
Mikkel Mailand summed up the effect of  these recent initiatives 
thus:
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The main problem with these new initiatives, of  course, is that 
they are likely to to become a source of  impoverishment rather 
than of  labor market inclusion, particularly if  it turns out that 
the explanation for the lack of  labor market participation is 
not this group’s work incentives, but a lack of  demand for their 
qualifications, discrimination or other explanations that transcend 
the supply side (Larsen and Mailand 2007: 8).
There are good reasons to believe that part of  the explanation 
lies with the demand side; but even when it lays with the supply side 
it is most probably related to problems other than unemployment. 
Hence, part of  the explanation for the absent or adverse effects of  
social policy efforts trying to bring unemployed social assistance 
recipients back into regular employment (or regular education) 
lies with the fact that many of  the claimants have other problems 
beside unemployment. Henning Bjerregaard Bach and Joachim 
Boll have investigated what barriers there exist for social assistance 
claimants to (re)join the labor market, and they found that among 
the ‘weakest’ clients 25 percent had reduced work capacity due 
to sickness, accident or relative incapacity (nedslidning) (2003). 
Furthermore the local social assistance administrations estimated 
that about 33 percent of  these clients had problems of  alcohol use 
and 22 percent was judged to have a consumption of  marijuana 
creating a barrier for their labor market performance. Finally 17 
percent of  the clients were diagnosed suffering from some kind 
of  mental illness. The administrations also judged that 60 percent 
of  the clients would be sorted out following a job interview due 
to insufficient personal competences like motivation, initiative, 
thoroughness, willingness to learn new skills and lack of  stability 
(Bach & Boll 2003). Clearly what these clients need are not more 
punishment, but more support and treatment.
A Critical Assessment of  ‘flexicurity’ in Denmark
In the Danish government’s report to the European 
Commission concerning the Lisbon objectives we can read the 
following (The Danish Government 2005: 35): 
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The Danish labour market has a favourable starting position. 
Denmark has an employment rate that is already higher than 
the joint EU objective of  70 percent, partially because of  the 
high participation of  woman in the labour market. Furthemore, 
the Danish structural unemployment is relatively low, which is 
partially because of  the Danish flexicurity model with flexible 
rules on hiring and dismissal, a well-developed unemployment 
benefit system and an active labour market policy – besed  on 
strict rules on availability, re-education, etc. Extensive reforms 
have been carried out, especially with regard to the development 
of  the structural unemployment and to keeping persons with 
reduced working capacity on the labour market.
Flexicurity is here explained with reference to what has been 
labeled the ‘golden triangle’ – the relationships between a flexible 
labor market, where it is easy to hire and fire, and – therefore – 
where there is a high flow of  workers in and out of  employment 
(high level of  external numerical flexibility); a generous welfare 
system which guarantees income security; and active labor policies 
(activation) aiming at upgrading workers’ skills. This is illustrated 
in figure 1 below:
Source: Developed by the then Ministry of  Labor (now: Ministry of  Employment) and adapted 
by Madsen (2006: 34).
Figure 1: The ‘Golden Triangle’ of  Flexicurity
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The idea is that if  employers can easily get rid of  workers 
in bad times they are more inclined to hire workers in good times, 
and workers when fired, are still able to maintain a reasonable life 
because of  relatively generous unemployment benefits. Finally, 
activation –   either because of  the scare/motivation effect (see 
below) or through skills upgrading – helps unemployed getting 
back into employment. Let us look a little more closely at these 
elements in turn.
A Flexible Labor Market
One way of  measuring the degree of  flexibility in the 
labor market is to calculate the percentage of  all employees who 
changed to another firm each year. The figure below shows that 
from 1980 to 2002 10 to 15 per cent of  all employees changed to 
another firm each year.
Source: Bredgaard, Larsen and Madsen (2006: 11).
Figure 2: Numerical flexibility, 1980-2002 (the percentage of  all 
employees who change to another firm each year
Job changes may involve spells of  unemployment. Hence, 
Ibsen and Westergaard-Nielsen (2005: 28) have calculated that 
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‘more than two thirds of  all workers who leave an employer each 
year will have found a new job before next year and less than one 
third ends up in no employment the next year. A little more than 
half  of  these become unemployed while the rest is either retiring, 
in education or out of  the labor force due to sickness or another 
reason.’ On such other reason could be activation.
 These job changes reflect the massive job creation and job 
destruction taking place in the economy and shows up in figures 
for job tenure. Figure 3 below gives the share of  the workforce 
that has less than one year’s tenure:
Source: Bredgaard, Larsen and Madsen (2006: 12).
Figure 3: Less than one year tenure in current job, 1981-2002 (%) 
Depending on the business cycle somewhere between 26 
and 31 per cent of  the workforce have held their jobs for less than 
one year, and average job tenure is eight years which is relatively 
low compared to most other countries (Ibsen and Westergaard-
Nielsen 2005: 4). This is demonstrated in figure 4 below. It has 
been pointed out that job tenure is much lower in Denmark than 
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in Sweden and Finland hence leading some observers to talk about 
the Danish labor market regime being a ‘hybrid’ between a liberal 
and a Scandinavian regime (see, e.g. Madsen 2006).
 
Source: Madsen (2006: 13).
Figure 4. Average tenure in years for employees in a  
number of  OECD-countries
       Figure 5    Figure 6
Source: The Danish Government (2005: 48).
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It is, hence correct that there is high labor mobility in the 
Danish labor market and the explanation for that is the low degree 
of  labor protection. Figure 6 shows that Denmark has the lowest 
degree of  labor protection in Europe and significantly lower than 
Norway Sweden. Figure 5 confirms that the high labor mobility 
in Denmark is the highest in Europe, apart from Spain. (See, also 
Andersen and Mailand 2005; Ibsen and Westergaard-Nielsen 2007; 
Bingley and Westergaard-Nielsen 2002.) The Danish labor market 
is, indeed, flexible.
A Generous Unemployment Benefit System?
On paper the Danish transfer payments to unemployed 
people look very good. There are no waiting days and in principle 
the amount is 90 percent of  prior wage or salary. However, 
since there is a ceiling compensation is in average much lower. 
Table 2 shows compensation rates calculated as the net value of  
unemployment insurance benefits set against the net wage of  an 
average production worker:
Table 2. Compensation from unemployment insurance in 
percent of  an average wage 1995 - 2005
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
67 66 65 64 65 64 64 63 63 60 62
Source: NOSOSCO (2008).
Compensation was around two-thirds of  an average workers 
income in 1995, but has fallen back to 60 percent in 2004. This 
can hardly be called generous, and it looks even worse when 
replacement rates for social assistance are calculated, as shown 
in table 3 below:
Table 3. Compensation in case of  unemployment,  
non insured, single, no children 1995 - 2005
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
47 46 45 44 44 44 44 43 43 41 42
Source: NOSOSCO (2008).
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The value of  social assistance benefits is equivalent to 41 
per cent of  an average workers wage, which – probably – nobody 
would label generous. What is furthermore clear from tables 3 and 
4 is that not only are compensation not very generous it is also 
less so over time; down from 67 and 47 per cent respectively to 
60 and 41 per cent respectively. However when the various child 
allowances are taken into account plus the possibilities of  extra 
allowances and housing allowance, the single social assistance 
recipient with a child is raised above the poverty line: 
Table 4. Compensation in case of  unemployment, non-insured, 
single parent with one child 1995 - 2005
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
77 77 76 74 71 73 73 71 72 69 72
Source: NOSOSCO (2008).
Nevertheless, the benefit period may be said to be generous 
in international comparison. Within the unemployment insurance 
system one can receive benefits for a total of  four years including 
periods of  activation, and in principle social assistance can be 
received indefinitely.
Evaluating Activation Measures
The National Institute of  Social Research has carried 
through a thorough evaluation of  these latest experiences of  the 
compulsory active labor market policy within social assistance. 
A representative group of  claimants receiving an offer of  job-
training, education or sheltered employment during January and 
February 1996 was investigated (Brogaard & Weise 1997; Weise 
& Brogaard 1997). The participants were, however, not evenly 
distributed on the various active measures. The mechanisms of  
sorting out works in such a way that those participants in job 
training had the best overall qualifications; less so regarding those 
in sheltered employment; and the least so those in education. 
Only a minority of  participants in job training measures actually 
achieved regular employment (14 percent), more so if  they have 
SER Social, Brasília, v. 11, n. 25, p. 244-273, jul./dez. 2009
Peter AbrAhAmson290
completed job training in the private sector (21 percent) than those 
from public job training (10 percent).
There exists quite a large discrepancy concerning whether 
the claimants had a number of  offers to choose from when they 
were asked themselves and the municipalities were asked. In the 
first case 75 percent of  the claimants experience that they could not 
make choices among more offers, while the municipalities recalled 
that that was only the case in fiver percent of  the cases! The 
majority of  claimants state that the fact that they would otherwise 
loose their benefits was very important for their acceptance of  the 
offer given to them; but nearly half  of  the claimants also found 
that it was of  great importance for them to ‘have something to 
get up to in the morning.’
Regarding the effects the investigation showed that both 
the condition of  the claimants and the kinds of  offers given were 
important: An analysis of  the probability of  being in employment 
or education half  a year after having been activated shows that the 
youngest, those with the best educational skills, and those with the 
best health do better than others. Taking this into consideration 
it is clear that participants in some kinds of  offers do better than 
participants in other offers. Activation within private job training 
but also within public job training and within production schools 
(produktionsskoler) enhances the probability of  getting a job/are 
in education (Weise & Brogaard 1997: 16). The overall effect 
regarding integration into main stream society via either a job or 
education was not much different to what earlier evaluations had 
shown; yet, perhaps, a little better since 42 percent stated that 
they were in such a situation after having been activated (Weise 
& Brogaard 1997: 19). Analyzing the first wave of  active labor 
market governance Per Kongshøj Madsen had found that about 
one third of  earlier activated persons were in employment one 
year later (1992a; 1992b).
A complementary investigation was carried out in the 
beginning of  the 2000s by Bach and reported in 2002. Here it was 
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measured how various forms of  municipal activation influenced 
the degree of  self  sufficiency/dependence among activated 
persons during the period of  time from 1995 to 1998 and the 
overall conclusion was that effects were, at best, very modest. 
Dependency was measured as the number of  weeks in a year where 
the person was dependent upon one of  the following transfer 
schemes: social assistance, unemployment insurance benefits, 
activation benefit, rehabilitation allowance, leave allowance, 
sickness benefits, early retirement pension, ‘transfer’ allowance 
(overgangsydelse, a scheme making it possible for mature workers 
ages 55 – 59 to receive unemployment benefits without actively 
seeking employment; the benefit was meant to carry these workers 
over from long-term unemployment to voluntary early retirement; 
subsequently it was phased out during the 1990s), and voluntary 
early retirement. Dependency was calculated as 0 percent if  the 
person was not relying on any of  these benefits throughout the 
year and as 100 percent if  the person was dependent upon one 
of  them for the whole year. The situation before receiving an 
activation offer and after was then measured for each category of  
activation measures based on register data calculations. About one 
third of  municipal activation consisted of  sheltered employment 
and about one fifth consisted of  individual job training within the 
public sector. Unfortunately, they had very little effect: sheltered 
employment reduced the dependency of  transfers with only three 
percentage points, while individual job training within the public 
sector reduced dependency by six percentage points. The biggest 
effect was calculated for individual job training within the private 
sector; in those cases dependency was reduced by 16 percentage 
points, but only 12 percent of  clients received such an offer (Bach 
2002). Interviews with the clients revealed that half  of  them did 
not see any aim of  going through activation other than they had 
to in order to keep their benefits. When they were to judge the 
effects of  activation they more often pointed to issues such as 
improvement of  their every day life and self  confidence than to 
issues of  being qualified for regular employment.
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 Similar to the study on municipal activation the Institute 
carried out a study on municipal rehabilitation. Rehabilitation is 
substantially congruent with activation but is based on different 
legislation and presupposes some kind of  reduced work capacity 
among the recipients. Physical problems dominate, but often 
there is a combination of  problems. Approximately 25 percent 
of  those starting a process of  rehabilitation drop out of  the 
program; but among those completing, the large majority found 
a job afterward. It is however difficult to determine whether this 
is a direct consequence of  the rehabilitation measures the study 
shows! Hence it is demonstrated that the average reduction in 
dependency is very limited (Filges, Harsløv, Nord-Larsen 2002).
 Presumably reflecting the above documented (lack of) 
effect a project called ‘Company rehabilitation as the road (back 
to) employment’ was started by the Social Democratic lead 
government and placed under the Ministry of  Social Affairs 
in 2000, and after the change of  government continued under 
the newly created (or at least renamed, see above) Ministry 
of  Employment (former Ministry of  Labor). More than 400 
companies, of  which 77 percent were private and 611 rehabilitees, 
participated in the project from 2000 to 2002. The National 
Institute of  Social Research evaluated the project and reported 
this in 2004 (Harsløv et al. 2004). Participants in the project had 
no or very limited affiliation to the labor market. They were 
primarily social assistance recipients (57 percent) or recipients of  
sickness benefits (37 percent). Nearly half  of  them completed a 
rehabilitation program within one of  the companies during the 
observation period. 80 percent of  those who had completed the 
program were in employment immediately after its termination; 
two-thirds in subsidized employment, for the most part flexi-jobs. 
The research team concluded that positive effects are associated 
with two things: focus and meaning. This means that the activities 
must be organized so that they consciously and explicitly aims at 
the goal (employment), and that the person to which the activity 
is directed experiences this as meaningful whereby he or she 
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becomes motivated for participation and makes an effort to reach 
the goal. The effects of  company rehabilitation were summed up 
as threefold: there was found to be a liaison-effect, meaning that the 
long-standing relationship between the client and the company 
may result in subsequent employment, subsidized or regular; 
there was also found to be a qualification-effect, meaning that the 
client actually acquired skills and other competences during the 
program; and a developmental-effect, meaning that the client to an 
increasing degree was able to handle his or her own situation 
and take responsibility for his or her own future and self  reliance 
(Harsløv et al. 2004).
Nevertheless, the unemployed have been supposed to be 
more flexible with regard to which kinds of  job they would accept, 
and at what wages etc. The National Institute of  social Research 
investigated the flexibility among 1.500 unemployed persons via 
questionnaires in the fall of  1994, and then traced their labor 
market performance via register data in the three following years 
(Bach 1999). Surprisingly it was found that there was no positive 
correlation between the degree of  flexibility and the degree of  
employment.
What have been demonstrated in this overview are rather 
limited effects of  activation measures; but one ‘curious’ effect 
has been identified by economists; one which they have labeled 
the ‘motivation effect’, or at it would better be understood by 
sociologists: the ‘scare effect.’ What has been discovered is that 
unemployed people significantly increase their job search and 
hence employment when they approach the time of  activation 
(Geerdsen 2003). So, e.g. Geerdsen tentatively concluded that the 
prospect of  activation may be more effective than activation itself. 
When it is only a tentative conclusion it is because there is the 
issue of  selection effects. It may be so that the most employable 
of  the unemployed are those who manage go get a job before 
they otherwise have to go into the activation measure (Geerdsen 
2003).
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Larsen and Mailand recently summed up activation policies 
thus: ‘…throughout the period [from 1994 and onwards] the policy 
has included complementary elements of  social disciplining and 
social integration. There is no doubt, however, that developments 
have been shifting from a significant focus on social integration 
to a much stronger emphasis on social disciplining’ (Larsen and 
Mailand 2007: 3).
Flexicurity: Job Miracle or Marginalization?
The fact that more than 12 per cent of  the workforce was 
unemployed in 1994 and that five years later unemployment was 
reduced to six per cent or less has given rise to suggestions of  
a Danish job miracle. Current unemployment of  3,8 per cent 
(June 2009) is on the rise, but from a very low starting point. 
Indeed – employment has increased in Denmark during the 1990s 
with more than 200.000 full time equivalent employees (the total 
workforce in 2008 was: 2.925.000) (Statistics Denmark 2009). But 
this figure does not account for population and labor force growth. 
So when the relative growth in employment is calculated as the 
employment rate it has only increased from 72, 4 per cent in 1995 
to 75, 5 per cent in 1999 (Abrahamson 2006a). This is significant 
but not impressive, and it means that the fall in unemployment 
has been much bigger than the increase in employment, which 
can only be explained by reclassification of  the non working part 
of  the population: many of  those who were unemployed in the 
early 1990s are now labeled sickness pay recipients, early retirees, 
on various leave schemes or in activation
SER Social, Brasília, v. 11, n. 25, p. 244-273, jul./dez. 2009
O retorno das medidas de ativação na política de bem-estar dinamarquesa: Emprego...
The active turn in Danish welfare policy: Employment and Social Protection...
295
Ta
bl
e 
5.
 U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t r
at
es
, t
ot
al
, m
en
 a
nd
 w
om
en
 19
94
 - 
20
08
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
To
ta
l
12
.3
10
.4
8.
9
7.
9
6.
6
5.
7
5.
4
5.
2
5.
2
6.
2
6.
4
5.
7
4.
5
3.
3
2.
0
M
en
11
9
7.
8
6.
7
5.
5
4.
9
4.
6
4.
5
4.
7
5.
7
5.
8
5
3.
8
2.
9
1.
9
W
om
en
13
.8
12
10
.1
9.
3
7.
8
6.
5
6.
2
5.
9
5.
8
6.
6
7
6.
4
5.
3
3.
8
2.
1
So
ur
ce
: S
ta
ti
st
ic
s 
D
en
m
ar
k 
(2
00
9)
.
Ta
bl
e 
6.
 A
ct
iv
ity
 a
nd
 E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t R
at
es
 19
97
 - 
20
08
 a
ll 
16
-6
4 
ye
ar
-o
ld
s 
 
 
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
A
ct
iv
it
y 
ra
te
 
A
ll
78
.9
79
.1
79
.2
79
.1
79
.5
79
.5
78
.5
78
.3
78
78
.3
78
.1
78
.3
M
en
83
.1
83
83
.1
82
.8
82
.9
82
.7
81
.6
81
.3
81
81
.2
81
.9
82
W
om
en
74
.6
75
75
.3
75
.3
76
76
.2
75
.2
75
.3
75
75
.3
74
.1
74
.6
E
m
p
lo
ym
en
t 
ra
te
A
ll
73
.4
74
.2
75
.5
75
.8
76
.1
76
.3
75
.1
74
.1
74
.2
75
.2
75
75
.7
M
en
78
78
.7
79
.6
79
.6
79
.7
79
.7
78
.3
77
.1
77
.3
78
.3
79
79
.5
W
om
en
68
.7
69
.6
71
.2
71
.9
72
.4
72
.9
71
.8
71
.1
71
.1
72
70
.9
71
.8
So
ur
ce
: S
ta
ti
st
ic
s 
D
en
m
ar
k 
(2
00
9)
.
SER Social, Brasília, v. 11, n. 25, p. 244-273, jul./dez. 2009
Peter AbrAhAmson296
The long-term consequences of  a flexible labor market and 
an encompassing welfare state are illustrated in figure 8 below. 25 
per cent of  the population ages 16 to 64 are not employed, they 
are living on public support outside the labor market – they are 
marginalized from main stream society.
Source: Bredgaard, Larsen and Madsen (2006: 17).
Figure 8: Adult population by source of  income,  
Denmark 1960-2003
One of  the mechanisms through which this process of  
marginalization operates is activation. It works as a sorting 
out system judging the qualifications and ‘motivations’ of  the 
unemployed and is instrumental in deciding whether one can 
return to the labor market or, whether, one has to seek support 
from one of  various schemes keeping the marginalized alive.
Conclusion: Typologizing Labor Market Governance
Social policy in late modern societies, and very strongly 
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so in Denmark, are changing radically from a reactive to a pro-
active approach to risks and social problems. If  this assessment 
is correct we need a substantial revision of  what we traditionally 
have understood social policy to be about. Welfare policies are 
being broadened in scope and are changing status within this new 
development with its emphasis on active labor market policies. By 
this we understand either some kind of  ‘artificial’ employment 
in the form of  subsidized or sheltered employment, or as some 
kind of  skill upgrading through job training or education as e.g. 
Janosky (1990: xxiii) defines it (education, job training, job creation 
and job placement):
Table 7  Typology of  Active Labor Market Policy Measures
Institutional Implementation
Social Assistance Social Insurance
Measures
Providing Jobs
Sheltered 
Employment
Subsidized Employment
Providing Skil ls
Job Training as 
Simulated Work
Standard Education
Furthermore, it is the judgment that active labor market 
policy governance come in two fundamentally different forms 
dependent upon the institutional framework. Within the social 
insurance system active labor market policies are, generally, 
developed as an extension of  workers’ rights to secure employment 
or upgrading through the ’normal’ or standard institutions of  
education and business. Within the social assistance programs, 
however, emphasis is much more on the obligation of  claimants to 
submit to various measures of  social control through simulated 
work training schemes and specially designed forms of  sheltered 
employment.
 So, overall, we can identify a process of  development 
and a process of  differentiation. The development away from 
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passively supporting marginalized citizens through transfer 
payments to actively try and promote employment through the 
creation of  jobs and skills, i.e. through various services, is in 
line with the tendency of  welfare development in late modern 
societies of  shifting the balance between transfers and services 
more towards services. Through the differentiation between 
active measures as basically social control and management of  
marginalized segments of  the population on the one side and 
real labor market integration through main stream institutions for 
the core working groups on the other side is a strengthening of  a 
traditional divide or bifurcation of  welfare provision in modern 
society into a fairly generous welfare state with a wide degree of  
entitlements to integrated workers vis-à-vis  rather restricted provisions 
to marginalized paupers.3
The development toward a more pro-active approach within 
welfare policy can be substantiated by an analysis of  official policy 
declarations with respect to how future welfare policies should be 
structured as they appear in the United Nations, OECD and the 
European Union (Abrahamson 1998; 2006b).
Despite the ideological, political and practical emphasis 
on activation we must seriously doubt that this is the reason for 
the relatively low incidences of  poverty in Scandinavia. Most 
important in this respect is the very high level of  labor market 
participation as demonstrated in this paper. Most adult people, 
both men and women, are working, and when they momentarily 
or permanently have to leave paid employment the transfers and 
services offered them, usually, keep them out of  income poverty. 
Unfortunately, the system organized to do away with the residual 
poverty, the systems of  social assistance, often fail in this respect. 
They, emphasized by activation measures, act as systems of  social 
control, monitoring and discipline.
3 The distinction between entitlements and provisions comes from Dahrendorf  (1994).
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